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Abstract
We prove that the positive fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic in the lan-
guage with two individual variables and a single monadic predicate letter, without
functional symbols, constants, and equality, is undecidable. This holds true regard-
less of whether we consider semantics with expanding or constant domains. We then
generalise this result to intervals [QBL,QKC] and [QBL,QFL], where QKC is
the logic of the weak law of the excluded middle and QBL and QFL are first-order
counterparts of Visser’s basic and formal logics, respectively. We also show that,
for most “natural” first-order modal logics, the two-variable fragment with a single
monadic predicate letter, without functional symbols, constants, and equality, is un-
decidable, regardless of whether we consider semantics with expanding or constant
domains. These include all sublogics of QKTB, QGL, and QGrz—among them,
QK, QT, QKB, QD, QK4, and QS4.
1 Introduction
While the (first-order) quantified classical logic QCl is undecidable [6], it contains a
number of rather expressive decidable fragments [3]. This has long stimulated interest
in drawing the borderline between decidable and undecidable fragments of QCl using a
variety of criteria, in isolation or in combination, imposed on the language. One such
criterion is the number and arity of predicate letters allowed in the language: while the
monadic fragment is decidable [1], the fragment containing a single binary letter is not,
as follows from [9]. Another criterion is the number of individual variables allowed in
the language: while the two-variable fragment is decidable [17, 10], the three-variable
fragment is not [24].
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Similar questions have long been of interest in (first-order) quantified intuitionistic and
modal logics. For languages without restrictions on the number of individual variables,
Kripke [14] has shown that all “natural” quantified modal logics with two monadic pred-
icate letters are undecidable, while Maslov, Mints, and Orevkov [15] and, independently,
Gabbay [8] have shown that quantified intuitionistic logic with a single monadic predicate
letter is undecidable.
The question of where the borderline lies in the intuitionistic and modal case when
it comes to the number of individual variables allowed in the language has recently been
investigated by Kontchakov, Kurucz, and Zakharyschev in [12]. It is shown in [12] that
two-variable fragments of quantified intuitionistic and all “natural” modal logics are un-
decidable. Moreover, it is established in [12] that, to obtain undecidability of two-variable
fragments, in the intuitionistic case, it suffices to use two binary and infinitely many
monadic predicate letters, while in the modal case, it suffices to use only (infinitely many)
monadic predicate letters.
Two questions were raised in [12] concerning the languages combining restrictions
on the number of individual variables and predicate letters: first, how many monadic
predicate letters are needed to obtain undecidability of the two-variable fragments in the
modal case, and second, whether it suffices to use monadic predicate letters to obtain
undecidability of the two-variable fragment in the intuitionistic case.
In the present paper, we address both of the aforementioned questions. First, we
show that for two-variable fragments of most modal logics considered in [12], it suffices to
use a single monadic predicate letter to obtain undecidability. Second, we show that the
positive fragment of quantified intuitionistic logic QInt is undecidable in the language
with two variables and a single monadic predicate letter. We also show that the latter
result holds true for all logics in intervals [QBL,QKC] and [QBL,QFL], where QKC
is the logic of the weak law of the excluded middle and QBL and QFL are first-order
counterparts of Visser’s basic and formal logics, respectively.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we prove undecidability results about
modal logics. In section 3, we do likewise for the intuitionistic and related logics. We con-
clude, in section 4, by discussing how our results can be applied in settings not considered
in this paper and pointing out some open questions following from our work.
2 Modal logics
In this section, we prove undecidability results about two-variable fragments of quanti-
fied modal logics with a single monadic predicate letter. This is essentially achieved by
adapting to the first-order language of Halpern’s technique [11] for establishing complexity
results for single-variable fragments of propositional modal logics.
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2.1 Syntax and semantics
A (first-order) quantified modal language contains countably many individual variables;
countably many predicate letters of every arity; Boolean connectives ∧ and ¬; modal
connective ✷; and a quantifier ∀. Formulas as well as the symbols ∨, →, ∃, and ✸ are
defined in the usual way. We also use the following abbreviations: ✷+ϕ = ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ and
✸
+ϕ = ϕ ∨✸ϕ.
A Kripke frame is a tuple F = 〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set (of worlds)
and R is a binary (accessibility) relation on W . A predicate Kripke frame is a tuple
FD = 〈W,R,D〉, where 〈W,R〉 is a Kripke frame and D is a function from W into a set
of non-empty subsets of some set (the domain of FD), satisfying the condition that wRw
′
implies D(w) ⊆ D(w′). We call the set D(w) the domain of w. We will also be interested
in predicate frames satisfying the condition that wRw′ implies D(w) = D(w′); we refer
to such frames as frames with constant domains.
A Kripke model is a tuple M = 〈W,R,D, I〉, where 〈W,R,D〉 is a predicate Kripke
frame and I is a function assigning to a world w ∈ W and an n-ary predicate letter P an
n-ary relation I(w, P ) on D(w). We refer to I as the interpretation of predicate letters
with respect to worlds in W .
An assignment in a model is a function g associating with every individual variable x
an element of the domain of the underlying frame.
The truth of a formula ϕ in a world w of a model M under an assignment g is
inductively defined as follows:
• M, w |=g P (x1, . . . , xn) if 〈g(x1), . . . , g(xn)〉 ∈ I(w, P );
• M, w |=g ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if M, w |=
g ϕ1 and M, w |=
g ϕ2;
• M, w |=g ¬ϕ1 if M, w 6|=
g ϕ1;
• M, w |=g ✷ϕ1 if wRw
′ implies M, w′ |=g ϕ1, for every w
′ ∈ W ;
• M, w |=g ∀xϕ1 if M, w |=
g′ ϕ1, for every assignment g
′ such that g′ differs from g
in at most the value of x and such that g′(x) ∈ D(w).
Note that, given a Kripke model M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 and w ∈ W , the tuple
Mw = 〈Dw, Iw〉, where Dw = D(w) and Iw(P ) = I(w, P ), is a classical predicate model.
We say that ϕ is true at world w of model M and write M, w |= ϕ if M, w |=g ϕ holds
for every g assigning to free variables of ϕ elements of D(w). We say that ϕ is true in M
and write M |= ϕ if M, w |= ϕ holds for every world w of M. We say that ϕ is true in
predicate frame FD and write FD |= ϕ if ϕ is true in every model based on FD. We say
that ϕ is true in frame F and write F |= ϕ if ϕ is true in every predicate frame of the form
FD. Finally, we say that a formula is true in a class of frames if it is true in every frame
from the class.
Let M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 be a model, w ∈ W , and a1, . . . , an ∈ D(w). Let ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
be a formula whose free variables are among x1, . . . , xn. We write M, w |= ϕ[a1, . . . , an]
to mean M, w |=g ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), where g(x1) = a1, . . . , g(xn) = an.
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Given a propositional normal modal logic L, let QL be QCl ⊕ L where ⊕ is the
operation of closure under (predicate) substitution, modus ponens, generalization, and
necessitation. Of particular interest to us are the quantified counterparts QGL, QGrz,
and QKTB of propositinal logics GL, QGrz, and KTB. We recall that GL is the logic
of Kripke frames whose accessibility relation is irreflexive, transitive, and contains no
infinite ascending chains, while Grz is the logic of frames whose accessibility relation
is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric, and does not contain infinite ascending chains of
pairwise distinct worlds (in other words, the accessibility relation on the frames for Grz
is the reflexive closure of the one on the frames for GL). We also recall that QGL and
QGrz are Kripke-incomplete [16, 20], but are valid on all the frames for GL and Grz,
respectively. Thus, for technical reasons—namely, to avoid being distracted with Kripke-
completeness—we define logics QGLsem and QGrzsem as the sets of quantified formulas
true in all the frames of GL and Grz, respectively. What is important for us is that
QGL ⊆ QGLsem and QGrz ⊆ QGrzsem. Lastly, we recall that KTB is the logic of
Kripke frames whose accessibility relation is reflexive and symmetric and that QKTB is
complete with respect to this class of frames.
Given a logic L and a closed formula ϕ in the language of L, we say that ϕ is L-
satisfiable if ¬ϕ 6∈ L. If L is complete with respect to a class C of frames, L-satisfiability
of ϕ amounts to ϕ being true at a world of a model based on a frame in C.
We now turn to addressing the question, raised in [12], of how many monadic predicate
letters are needed in the language of quantified modal logics to obtain undecidability of
their two-variable fragments. Using suitable adaptations of a technique originally pro-
posed in [11], and further refined in [4], [22], and [23], for propositinal languages, we show
that all sublogics of QGL, QGrz, and QKTB are undecidable in the language with a
single monadic predicate letter.
2.2 Sublogics of QGL and QGrz
It is established in [12], Theorem 3, that two-variable fragments of a wide variety of
quantified modal logics in the language with infinitely many monadic predicate letters are
undecidable.
To that end, it is shown in [12] how, given an instance T of an undecidable tiling
problem [2], one can effectively compute a formula ξT containing only monadic predicate
letters and two individual variables such that T tiles N×N if, and only if, ξT is satisfiable
in a logic L such that L is the set of quantified formulas valid on all the frames of a
propositional logic valid on a frame containing a world that can see all worlds from an
infinite set V1, each of which can in its turn see infinitely many worlds from an infinite
set V2 disjoint from V1. Note that the logics QK, QGL
sem, and QGrzsem satisfy the
above condition; indeed, for GL and Grz, we can take V1 and V2 to be infinite anti-
chains of irreflexive and reflexive worlds, respectively. As formulas ξT are computed in
the same way for all of QK, QGLsem, and QGrzsem, it follows that if T does not tile
N×N, then ξT is not satisfiable in any of them, and if T tiles N×N, then ξT is satisfiable
in each of them. Let L be a logic such that QK ⊆ L ⊆ QGLsem. If T does not tile
N × N, then ¬ξT ∈ QK, and thus ¬ξT ∈ L. If, on the other hand, T tiles N × N, then
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¬ξT 6∈ QGL
sem, and thus ¬ξT 6∈ L. This gives us a reduction of (the complement of) the
undecidable tiling problem to L using formulas with only monadic predicate letters and
two individual variables. Thus, every logic in [QK,QGL] is undecidable in the language
with a single monadic letter and two individual variables; a similar argument can be made
for logics in [QK,QGrz].
As formulas ξT are computed in the same way for all the logics in [QK,QGL] and
[QK,QGrz], all formulas ¬ξT corresponding to “bad” instances of the tiling problem [2]
make up an undecidable fragment, F , that belongs to every logic in [QK,QGL] and
[QK,QGrz]. In the rest of this section, we effectively embed F , using an embedding e
that does not increase the number of individual variables in a formula, into a fragment, F e,
containing a single monadic predicate letter and belonging to every logic in [QK,QGL]
and [QK,QGrz]. To that end, given a formula ϕ, we effectively construct, using e, the
formula ϕe, such that ϕ ∈ F if, and only if, ϕe ∈ F e; as ϕe contains the same number of
individual variables as ϕ, our main result in this section immediately follows.
Let ϕ be a (closed) formula containing monadic predicate letters P1, . . . , Pn. Let Pn+1
be a monadic predicate letter distinct from P1, . . . , Pn and let B = ∀xPn+1(x). Define an
embedding ·′ as follows:
Pi(x)
′ = Pi(x), where i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
(¬φ)′ = ¬φ′;
(φ ∧ ψ)′ = φ′ ∧ ψ′;
(∀xφ)′ = ∀xφ′;
(✷φ)′ = ✷(B → φ′).
Lemma 2.1 Let L ∈ {QK,QGLsem,QGrzsem}. Then, ϕ is L-satisfiable if, and only if,
B ∧ ϕ′ is L-satisfiable.
Proof. Assume that M, w0 |= ϕ, for some M based on a frame for L and some w0. Let
M′ be a model that extends M by setting I(w, Pn+1) = D(w), for every w ∈ W . Then,
M′, w0 |= B ∧ϕ
′. Conversely, assume that M, w0 |= B ∧ϕ
′, for some M based on a frame
for L. Let M′ be a submodel of M with W ′ = {w : M, w |= B}. Then, M′, w0 |= ϕ.
Note that, for every logic L in the statement of the Lemma,M′ is based on a frame for L. ✷
Remark 2.2 In view of the proof of Lemma 2.1, if B ∧ ϕ′ is satisfied in a model M, we
can assume, without a loss of generality, that B is true in M.
Now, given a monadic predicate letter P , we inductively define the following sequence
of formulas:
δ1(x) = P (x) ∧✸(¬P (x) ∧✸✷
+P (x));
δm+1(x) = P (x) ∧✸(¬P (x) ∧✸δm(x)).
Using formulas from this sequence, define, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}, the formula
αk(x) = δk(x) ∧ ¬δk+1(x) ∧✸✷
+¬P (x).
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We now define models associated with formulas αk(x). For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1},
let Fk = 〈Wk, Rk〉 be a Kripke frame where Wk = {w
0
k, . . . , w
2k
k } ∪ {w
∗
k} and Rk is the
transitive closure of the relation {〈wik, w
i+1
k 〉 : 0 6 i < 2k}∪ {〈w
0
k, w
∗
k〉}. For every such k,
let Mk = 〈Wk, Rk, D, I〉 be a model with constant domains and let a be an individual in
the domain of every Mk (other than that, the relationship between the domains of Mks
is immaterial at this point). We say that Mk is a-suitable if
Mk, w |= P [a] ⇐⇒ w = w
2i
k , for i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.
Lemma 2.3 Let a be an individual in the domain of the models M1, . . . ,Mn+1 and let
M1, . . . ,Mn+1 be a-suitable. Then,
Mk, w |= αm[a] ⇐⇒ k = m and w = w
0
k.
Proof. Straightforward. ✷
Remark 2.4 Notice that the statement of Lemma 2.3 holds true if we replace the acces-
sibility relations in M1, . . . ,Mn+1 with their reflexive closures.
Now, for every αk(x), where k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}, define
βk(x) = ¬P (x) ∧✸αk(x).
Let ϕ∗ be the result of replacing in ϕ′ of Pk(x) with βk(x), for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}.
Lemma 2.5 Let L ∈ {QK,QGLsem,QGrzsem}. Then, B ∧ ϕ′ is L-satisfiable if, and
only if, ∀x βn+1(x) ∧ ϕ
∗ is L-satisfiable.
Proof. The right-to-left direction follows from the closure of L under predicate substitu-
tion. For the other direction, suppose that B∧ϕ′ is QK-satisfiable. Let M = 〈W,R,D, I〉
be a model such that M, w0 |= B ∧ ϕ
′, for some w0 ∈ W . In view of Remark 2.2, we may
assume, without a loss of generality, that M |= B.
For every w ∈ W and every frame Fk (1 6 k 6 n + 1), let F
w
k = 〈{w} ×Wk, R
w
k 〉 be
an isomorphic copy of Fk. For every w ∈ W and k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}, add {w} ×Wk to W
to obtain the set W ∗. Define the relation R∗ on W ∗ as follows:
R∗ = R ∪
⋃{
Rwk ∪ {〈w, (w,w
0
k)〉} : w ∈ W, 1 6 k 6 n + 1
}
.
Thus, for every w ∈ W , we make the roots of frames Fw1 , . . . ,F
w
n+1 accessible from w.
Next, for every u ∈ W ∗ let
D∗(u) =
{
D(u), if u ∈ W,
D(w), if u ∈ {w} ×Wk.
Finally, for every u ∈ W ∗ and every a ∈ D∗(u), let
〈a〉 ∈ I∗(u, P ) ⇌ u = (w,w2ik ), for some w ∈ W , k ∈ {1, . . . , n+1},
and i ∈ {0, . . . , k}; and M, w |= Pk[a].
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Let M∗ = 〈W ∗, R∗, D∗, I∗〉. It immediately follows from Lemma 2.3 that, for every
w ∈ W , every a ∈ D(w), and every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1},
M, w |= Pk[a] ⇐⇒ M
∗, w |= βk[a].
We can then show that, for every w ∈ W , every subformula ψ(x1, . . . , xm) of ϕ, and every
a1, . . . , am ∈ D(w),
M, w |= ψ′[a1, . . . , am] ⇐⇒ M
∗, w |= ψ∗[a1, . . . , am],
where ψ∗(x1, . . . , xm) is obtained by substituting β1(x), . . . , βn+1(x) for P1(x), . . . , Pn+1(x)
in ψ′(x1, . . . , xm).
The proof proceeds by induction. We only consider the modal case, leaving the
rest to the reader. In this case, ψ′(x1, . . . , xm) = ✷(∀xPn+1(x) → χ
′(x1, . . . , xm)) and
ψ∗(x1, . . . , xm) = ✷(∀x βn+1(x) → χ
∗(x1, . . . , xm)). If M
∗, w 6|= ψ∗[a1, . . . , am], then there
exists w′ ∈ W ∗ with wR∗w′ such that M∗, w′ |= ∀x βn+1(x) and M
∗, w′ 6|= χ∗[a1, . . . , am].
The condition M∗, w′ |= ∀x βn+1(x) guarantees that w
′ ∈ W ; therefore, we may apply
the inductive hypothesis to conclude that M, w′ 6|= χ′[a1, . . . , am]. The other direction is
straightforward.
Thus, M∗, w0 |= ∀x βn+1(x) ∧ ϕ
∗, i. e., ∀x βn+1(x) ∧ ϕ
∗ is QK-satisfiable.
For QGLsem and QGrzsem, the proof is similar. The only difference is that, when
defining the model M∗, instead of R∗ mentioned above, we take as the accessibility
relations its transitive, and its reflexive and transitive, closure, respectively. ✷
We can now prove our main result in this section.
Theorem 2.6 Let L be a logic such that QK ⊆ L ⊆ QGL or QK ⊆ L ⊆ QGrz.
Then, L is undecidable in the language with two individual variables and a single monadic
predicate letter.
Proof. Given a formula ϕ with two individual variables and only monadic predicate
letters, let e(ϕ) = ∀x βn+1(x) ∧ ϕ
∗. Let ¬ξT be a formula corresponding to a “bad”
instance T of the tiling problem [2]. Due to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.5, ¬ξT ∈ QK if, and
only if, ¬e(ξT ) ∈ QK; likewise, ¬ξT ∈ QGL
sem if, and only if, ¬e(ξT ) ∈ QGL
sem. As
noticed at the beginning of this section, all such ¬ξT make up an undecidable fragment,
F , belonging to every logic in [QK,QGLsem] and [QK,QGrzsem]. Therefore, every such
logic contains an undecidable fragment F e = {¬e(ξT ) : ¬ξT ∈ F} made up of formulas
with two individual variables and a single monadic predicate letter. The statement of
the Theorem follows. ✷
Corollary 2.7 QK, QT, QD, QK4, QS4, QGL, and QGrz are undecidable in the
language with two individual variables and a single monadic predicate letter.
Remark 2.8 Theorem 2.6 and Corollary 2.7 hold true if we replace every logic L men-
tioned in their statements with L⊕ bf , where bf = ∀x✷P (x)→ ✷∀xP (x); adding bf to
L forces us to consider only predicate frames for L with constant domains.
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We conclude this section by noticing that the results obtained herein are quite tight. In
has been shown in [26], Theorem 5.1, that for logicsQK,QT,QK4, andQS4, adding—on
top of the restriction to at most two individual variables and a single monadic predicate
letter—the very slight restriction that modal operators apply only to formulas with at
most one free individual variable results in decidable fragments. As noticed in [26], the
same holds true for the other logics mentioned in Corollary 2.7.
2.3 Sublogics of QKTB
We now prove results similar to those established in the preceding section for logics in
the interval [QK,QKTB], where QKTB is the predicate logic of reflexive and symmet-
ric frames. In so doing, we use an adaptation of a technique used in [23] for proving
results about computational complexity of finite-variable fragments of sublogics of the
propositional logic KTB.
We proceed as in the previous section right up to the point where formulas αk and
models Mk are defined. Then, we define the formulas αk as follows. First, let
✷
0ϕ = ϕ, ✷60ϕ = ϕ,
✷
n+1ϕ = ✷✷nϕ, ✷6n+1ϕ = ✷6nϕ ∧✷n+1ϕ,
✸
nϕ = ¬✷n¬ϕ, ✸6nϕ = ¬✷6n¬ϕ.
Next, inductively define, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}, the following sequence of formulas:
δ(x) = ✷+P (x);
δkk(x) = ✷
6k¬P (x) ∧✸k+1P (x) ∧✸k+2δ(x);
δki (x) = ✷
6i¬P (x) ∧✸i+1P (x) ∧✸2i+3δki+1(x), where 1 6 i < k,
and let, for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1},
αk(x) = P (x) ∧✸
2δk1 (x).
Now we define models Mk associated with formulas αk. Given an individual a and
k ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1}, a model Mk, whose domain contains a, looks as follows. For brevity,
we call some worlds a-worlds; if a world is not an a-world, we call it an a¯-world. The
model is a chain of worlds whose root, rk, is an a-world. The root is part of a pattern of
worlds, described below, which is in turn succeeded by three final a-worlds. The pattern
looks as follows: a single a-world is followed by 2i + 1 a¯-worlds, for 1 6 i 6 k. Thus
the chain looks as follows: the root (an a-world), then three a¯-worlds, then an a-world,
then five a¯-worlds, then an a-world, . . . , then an a-world, then 2k + 1 a¯-worlds, then
three a-worlds. The accessibility relation between the worlds of Mk is both reflexive and
symmetric.
We say that Mk is a-suitable if
Mk, w |= P [a] ⇐⇒ w is an a-world.
We can, then, prove the following analogue of Lemma 2.3.
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Lemma 2.9 Let a be an individual in the domain of the models M1, . . . ,Mn+1 and let
M1, . . . ,Mn+1 be a-suitable. Then,
Mk, w |= αm[a] ⇐⇒ k = m and w = rk.
Proof. Straightforard. ✷
As before, let
βk(x) = ¬P (x) ∧✸αk(x),
and let ϕ∗ be the result of replacing in ϕ′ of Pk(x) with βk(x), for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n+1}.
We can then prove the following analogue of Lemma 2.5:
Lemma 2.10 Let L ∈ {QK,QKTB}. Then, B ∧ ϕ′ is L-satisfiable if, and only if,
∀x βn+1(x) ∧ ϕ
∗ is L-satisfiable.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.5, with the observation that the truth status
of formulas αk is not changed at the worlds of the models Mk once they get attached
to the model M satisfying the formula B ∧ ϕ′ to obtain the model M∗ satisfying the
formula ∀x βn+1(x)∧ϕ
∗, even though their roots can now see the worlds of M due to the
symmetry of the accessibility relation of M∗. For a detailed argument showing that the
truth status of formulas αk in M
∗ at worlds from Mk is not affected, we refer the reader
to the proof of Lemma 3.9 in [23]. ✷
Then, using an argument analogous to the one used in the proof of Theorem 2.6, we
obtain the following:
Theorem 2.11 Let L be a logic such that QK ⊆ L ⊆ QKTB. Then, L is undecidable
in the language with two individual variables and a single monadic predicate letter.
Corollary 2.12 QKB and QKTB are undecidable in the language with two individual
variables and a single monadic predicate letter.
3 Intuitionistic and related logics
We now consider logics closely related to the quantified intuitionistic logic QInt.
3.1 Syntax and semantics
The (first-order) quantified intuitionistic language contains countably many individual
variables; countably many predicate letters of every arity; propositional constants ⊥
(“falsehood”) and ⊤ (“truth”); propositional connectives ∧, ∨, and →; and quantifiers
∃ and ∀. Formulas are defined in the usual way; when parentheses are left out, ∧ and
∨ are understood to bind tighter than →. We also use the following abbreviations:
✷ϕ = ⊤ → ϕ, ✷0ϕ = ϕ, and ✷n+1ϕ = ✷✷nϕ.
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A Kripke frame is a tuple F = 〈W,R〉, where W is a non-empty set (of worlds) and R
is a binary (accessibility) relation on W that is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive.
A Kripke model M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 is defined as in the modal case, except that
the interpretation function I satisfies the additional condition that wRw′ implies
I(w, P ) ⊆ I(w′, P ). An assignment is defined as in the modal case.
The truth of a formula ϕ in a world w of a model M under an assignment g is
inductively defined as follows:
• M, w 6|=g ⊥;
• M, w |=g ⊤;
• M, w |=g P (x1, . . . , xn) if 〈g(x1), . . . , g(xn)〉 ∈ I(w, P );
• M, w |=g ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if M, w |=
g ϕ1 and M, w |=
g ϕ2;
• M, w |=g ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 if M, w |=
g ϕ1 or M, w |=
g ϕ2;
• M, w |=g ϕ1 → ϕ2 if wRw
′ and M, w′ |=g ϕ1 imply M, w
′ |=g ϕ2, for every w
′ ∈ W ;
• M, w |=g ∃xϕ1 if M, w |=
g′ ϕ1, for some assignment g
′ that differs from g at most
in the value of x and such that g′(x) ∈ D(w);
• M, w |=g ∀xϕ1 if M, w
′ |=g
′
ϕ1, for every w
′ ∈ W such that wRw′ and every
assignment g′ such that g′ differs from g in at most the value of x and such that
g′(x) ∈ D(w′).
Truth in models, frames, and classes of frames is defined as in the modal case. QInt
is the set of formulas true in all frames.
We also consider some logics closely related to QInt. First, QKC is the quantified
counterpart of the propositional logic KC = Int + ¬p ∨ ¬¬p. Semantically, QKC is
characterized by the frames that satisfy the (convergence) condition that wRv1 and wRv2
imply the existence of a world u such that v1Ru and v2Ru.
Second, we consider quantified counterparts of Visser’s basic propositional logic BPL
and formal propositional logic FPL [25]: BPL and FPL are logics in the intuitionistic
language whose modal companions are K4 and GL—that is, given the Go¨del’s trans-
lation t of the intuitionistic language into the modal one (see, for example, [5], § 3.9),
BPL = t−1(K4) and FPL = t−1(GL). Therefore, we define their quantified counterparts
as logics QBL = T−1(QK4) and QFL = T−1(QGL), where T is the extension of t with
the following clauses: T (∃xϕ) = ∃xT (ϕ); and T (∀x1 . . .∀xn ϕ) = ✷∀x1 . . .∀xn T (ϕ),
where ϕ does not begin with a universal quantifier. To give the semantic account of QBL
and QFL, we use Kripke frames and models as defined for QInt, except that the acces-
sibility relation is now only required to be anti-symmetric and transitive. The relation
M, w |=g ϕ is defined as in the intuitionistic case, with the following modification for the
universal quantifiers:
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• M, w |=g ∀x1 . . .∀xn ϕ1, where ϕ1 does not begin with a universal quantifier,
if M, w′ |=g
′
ϕ1, for every w
′ ∈ W such that wRw′ and every assignment g′
such that g′ differs from g in at most the values of x1, . . . , xn and such that
g′(x1), . . . , g
′(xn) ∈ D(w
′).
This clause is required to make, in the absence of reflexivity of the accessibility relation,
the formula ∀x∀y ϕ equivalent to the formula ∀y∀xϕ. Then, QBL is sound (and complete)
with respect to all such frames, while QFL is sound (but not complete) with respect to the
subclass where the converse of the accessibility relation is well-founded (i. e., with respect
to the frames of the logic GL). For technical reasons, namely to avoid being distracted
with Kripke-completeness, we define the logic QFLsem as the set of formulas valid in all
frames where the converse of the accessibility relation is well-founded; all that matters to
us is that QFL ⊆ QFLsem.
3.2 Undecidability results
We now address the question, raised in [12], of whether it suffices to use only monadic
predicate letters to obtain undecidability of the two-variable fragment QInt(2) of QInt.
We show that, in fact, it suffices to use a single monadic predicate letter to obtain un-
decidability of QInt(2). We do so by suitably adapting the technique used in [21] to
(polynomially) reduce satisfiability in propositional intuitionistic logic Int to satisfiabil-
ity in the fragment of Int with only two propositional variables. As the technique from [21]
requires that we work with positive formulas, we first show that the positive monadic frag-
ment of QInt(2) is undecidable. We note here that transitioning from the propositional
language to the first-order one, we “strengthen” the result from [21] in the following sense:
while in the propositional case, (the positive fragment of) Int is polynomially reducible
to its two-variable subfragment, in the the first-order case, we (polynomially) reduce (the
positive fragment of) QInt(2) to its subfragment containing a single predicate letter.1
Working with the positive fragment of QInt also allows us to extend our results to the
interval [QInt,QKC], as all logics in this interval share the positive fragment. More-
over, a modification of this construction allows us to obtain analogous results for logics
in [QBL,QFL].
It is proven in [12] that QInt(2) is undecidable by reducing the following undecidable
tiling problem [2] to the complement of QInt(2): given a finite set T of tile types that
are tuples of colours t = 〈left(t), right(t), up(t), down(t)〉, decide whether T tiles the grid
N×N in the sense that there exists a function τ : N×N→ T such that, for every i, j ∈ N,
we have up(τ(i, j)) = down(τ(i, j + 1)) and right(τ(i, j)) = left(τ(i+ 1, j)). The results
in this section build on this proof.
We start off by proving that the positive fragment of QInt(2) containing two binary
and an unlimited number of unary predicate letters, as well as two propositional variables,
is undecidable. This is achieved by eliminating the constant ⊥ from the formulas used in
the proof of undecidability of QInt(2) from [12]. For most formulas from [12], all we do
1In light of [19], the reduction of Int to its single-variable fragment would imply that the complexity
classes P and PSPACE are equivalent.
11
is replace ⊥ with a propositional variable q. The resultant formulas are listed below for
the reader’s convenience; for ease of reference, we preserve the numbering from [12]:
∀x
∨
t∈T
(Pt(x) ∧
∧
t′ 6=t
(Pt′(x)→ q)), (1)
∧
right(t)6=left(t′)
∀x ∀y (H(x, y) ∧ Pt(x) ∧ Pt′(y)→ q), (2)
∧
up(t)6=down(t′)
∀x ∀y (V (x, y) ∧ Pt(x) ∧ Pt′(y)→ q), (3)
∀x ∃y H(x, y) ∧ ∀x ∃y V (x, y), (4)
∀x ∀y (V (x, y) ∨ (V (x, y)→ q)), (5)
∀x ∀y [V (x, y) ∧ ∃x (D(x) ∧H(y, x))→ ∀y (H(x, y)→ ∀x (D(x)→ V (y, x)))]. (6)
Let ψ+T be the conjunction of formulas (1) through (6). Then, define
ϕ+T = ψ
+
T → ((∃x (D(x)→ q)→ p)→ p),
where p is a propositional variable distinct from q.
Lemma 3.1 ϕ+T /∈ QInt(2) if, and only if, T tiles N× N.
Proof. The proof is a minor modification of the proof of Theorem 1 from [12], with q
essentially playing the role that “falsehood” plays in [12].
For the left to right direction, we observe that, given a model M and a world w such
that M, w 6|= ϕ+T , as well as an arbitrary d ∈ D(w), there exists a world u in M with wRu
such that M, u |= D[d] and M, u 6|= q. This is a straightforward consequence of the fact
that M, w 6|= (∃x (D(x)→ q)→ p)→ p. Given this, the argument from [12] applies.
For the other direction, the model falsifying ϕ+T is different from the one used in [12]
only in the evaluation of p and q. Thus, we use the same frame and interpretation of
predicate letters as in [12], and additionally make q false at every world of the model and
make p false at w0 and true at every other world. ✷
Since ϕ+T is a positive formula, this immediately gives us the following:
Corollary 3.2 The positive fragment of QInt with two individual variables, two binary
predicate letters, an unlimited number of unary predicate letters, and two propositional
variables is undecidable.
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We now show how, drawing on an idea of Kripke’s for modal logics [14], one can, in
the positive fragment of QInt, simulate binary predicate letters using monadic predicate
letters and propositional variables. As this does not increase the number of individual
variables in a formula, it will allow us to eliminate binary predicate letters from the
formula ϕ+T .
Lemma 3.3 Let χ be a positive formula in QInt containing an occurrence of a binary
predicate letter Q, and let Q1 and Q2 be unary predicate letters, and r and s be propo-
sitional variables, not occurring in χ. Let χ′ be the result of uniformly replacing every
subformula of χ of the form Q(x, y) with (Q1(x) ∧ Q2(y) → r) ∨ s. Then, χ ∈ QInt if,
and only if, χ′ ∈ QInt.
Proof. The left-to-right direction follows from the closure of QInt under substitution.
For the other direction, assume that there exist M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 and w0 ∈ W such that
M, w0 6|= χ. We modify M to obtain a model M
′ falsifying χ′ as follows. For every w ∈ W
and every a, b ∈ D(w) such that M, w 6|= Q[a, b], add to W a world wa,b with wR
′wa,b and
let
M′, wa,b 6|= r;
M′, wa,b |= s;
M′, wa,b |= Q1[d] ⇌ d = a;
M′, wa,b |= Q2[d] ⇌ d = b;
and let all the predicate letters different from Q1 and Q2 and occurring in χ
′ be universally
true at every such world; likewise for propositional variables different from r and s. Also,
let M′, w 6|= s.
Then we can show that M, w |= θ[a1, . . . , am] if, and only if, M
′, w |= θ′[a1, . . . , am],
for every subformula θ of χ, every w ∈ W , and every a1, . . . , am ∈ D(w), where θ
′ is the
result of substituting in θ every occurrence of Q(x, y) with (Q1(x)∧Q2(y)→ r)∨ s. The
proof is by induction on θ.
For the base case, first note that ifM, w 6|= Q[a, b], then the presence inM′ of the world
wa,b guarantees thatM
′, w 6|= (Q1[a]∧Q2[b] → r)∨s; on the other hand, if M, w |= Q[a, b],
then M′, w |= (Q1[a] ∧Q2[b]→ r) ∨ s, as M, u 6|= Q1[a] or M, u 6|= Q2[b], for every u with
wR′u.
The cases for θ = θ1 ∨ θ2, θ = θ1 ∧ θ2, and θ = ∃x θ1 are straightforward.
Let θ = θ1 → θ2. Assume that M
′, w 6|= θ′[a1, . . . , am]. Then, M
′, u |= θ′1[a1, . . . , am]
and M′, u 6|= θ′2[a1, . . . , am], for some u ∈ W
′ with wR′u. If we could apply the inductive
hypothesis to u, we would be done. To see that we can, notice that θ′2 is build out of
atomic formulas and the formula (Q1(x) ∧ Q2(y) → r) ∨ s, all of which are true under
every assignment in every w′ ∈ W ′ −W , using only ∧, ∨, →, ∃, and ∀. Therefore, θ′2
is true in every w′ ∈ W ′ −W under every assignment; hence, u ∈ W and the inductive
hypothesis is, therefore, applicable. Thus, M, w 6|= θ[a1, . . . , am]. The other direction is
straightforward.
The case θ = ∀x θ1 is similarly argued. ✷
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Figure 1: Frame F
Now, let ξ+T be the result of replacing in ϕ
+
T of
H(x, y) with (H1(x) ∧H2(y)→ r1) ∨ s1;
V (x, y) with (V1(x) ∧ V2(y) → r2) ∨ s2.
In view of Lemma 3.3, ξ+T 6∈ QInt(2) if, and only if, T tiles N×N. As we can replace in ξ
+
T
a propositinal variable such as q with, say, ∃xQ(x), we immediately obtain the following:
Theorem 3.4 The positive monadic fragment of QInt with two individual variables is
undecidable.
We now embed the positive monadic fragment of QInt(2) into its subfragment con-
taining formulas with only one monadic predicate letter, suitably adapting the technique
from [21]. As this embedding does not introduce any fresh variables, our main result in
this section immediately follows.
We start by defining the frame F = 〈W,R〉. This frame, depicted in Figure 1, is made
up of “levels” of worlds. The three top-most levels are depicted at the top of Figure 1:
the top-most level contains worlds d1, d2, and d3; level 0, worlds a
0
1, a
0
2, b
0
1, and b
0
2; level
1, worlds a11, a
1
2, a
1
3, b
1
1, b
1
2, and b
1
3. The successive levels are defined inductively. Assume
that level k has been defined and that it contains worlds ak1, . . . , a
k
n, b
k
1, . . . , b
k
n. For every
i, j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, the level k+1 contains the world ak+1m such that a
k+1
m Rb
k
1, a
k+1
m Ra
k
i , and
ak+1m Rb
k
j , as well as the world b
k+1
m such that b
k+1
m Ra
k
1, b
k+1
m Ra
k
i , and b
k+1
m Rb
k
j . Let M be a
model with constant domains, say Z, based on F (without a loss of generality, we can as-
sume that Z contains at least three individuals) and let a ∈ Z. We say thatM is a-suitable
if, for some b ∈ Z such that b 6= a, the following hold: I(d2, P ) = {〈c〉 : c ∈ Z and c 6= a};
I(d3, P ) = {〈a〉, 〈b〉}; I(b
1
0, P ) = {〈b〉}; I(w, P ) = ∅, for w 6∈ {d2, d3, b
0
1}.
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We now define formulas, of one free variable x, that correspond to the worlds of an
a-suitable model in the sense that each formula fails at a world w of the model, with
a assigned to x, exactly when w can see the world corresponding to the formula. For
these formulas, we use notation that makes clear which worlds they correspond to; thus,
formula Di corresponds to world di, A
k
i to a
k
i , and B
k
i to b
k
i . First, we define formulas for
the three top-most levels:
D1 = ∃xP (x), A
1
1(x) = A
0
1(x) ∧ A
0
2(x)→ B
0
1(x) ∨B
0
2(x),
D2(x) = ∃xP (x)→ P (x), A
1
2(x) = A
0
1(x) ∧ B
0
1(x)→ A
0
2(x) ∨B
0
2(x),
D3(x) = P (x)→ ∀xP (x), A
1
3(x) = A
0
1(x) ∧ B
0
2(x)→ A
0
2(x) ∨B
0
1(x),
A01(x) = D2(x)→ D1 ∨D3(x), B
1
1(x) = A
0
2(x) ∧ B
0
1(x)→ A
0
1(x) ∨B
0
2(x),
A02(x) = D3(x)→ D1 ∨D2(x), B
1
2(x) = A
0
2(x) ∧ B
0
2(x)→ A
0
1(x) ∨B
0
1(x),
B01(x) = D1 → D2(x) ∨D3(x), B
1
3(x) = B
0
1(x) ∧ B
0
2(x)→ A
0
1(x) ∨A
0
2(x).
B02(x) = A
0
1(x) ∧ A
0
2(x) ∧B
0
1(x)→
D1 ∨D2(x) ∨D3(x),
Now, assume that the formulas for level k have been defined and define
Ak+1m (x) = A
k
1(x)→ B
k
1 (x) ∨ A
k
i (x) ∨B
k
j (x),
Bk+1m (x) = B
k
1 (x)→ A
k
1(x) ∨ A
k
i (x) ∨B
k
j (x),
where m is uniquely determined for every pair i, j ∈ {2, . . . , nk}, where nk is the maximal
index for formulas of level k.
Lemma 3.5 Let M = 〈W,R,D, I〉 be an a-suitable model and let w ∈ W . Then,
M, w 6|= Akm[a] ⇐⇒ wRa
k
m, and M, w 6|= B
k
m[a] ⇐⇒ wRb
k
m.
Proof. Induction on k. ✷
Now, let ϕ be a positive formula containing monadic predicate letters P1, . . . , Pn (we
may assume n > 2). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define
αi(x) = A
n
i (x) ∨B
n
i (x).
Finally, let ϕ∗ be the result of substituting, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, of αi(x) for Pi(x)
into ϕ.
Lemma 3.6 ϕ ∈ QInt if, and only if, ϕ∗ ∈ QInt.
Proof. The right-to-left direction follows from the closure of QInt under pred-
icate substitution. For the other direction, assume that Mϕ, w0 6|= ϕ for some
Mϕ = 〈Wϕ, Rϕ, Dϕ, Iϕ〉 and w0 ∈ Wϕ. (We may assume without a loss of generality
that the domain of Mϕ contains at least three individuals; we use this fact in the con-
struction of M∗ below.) We need to construct a model M∗ falsifying ϕ∗ at some world.
First, for every w ∈ Wϕ and a ∈ Dϕ(w), consider an a-suitable model
Mwa = 〈W
w
a , R
w
a , D
w
a , I
w
a 〉, based on a copy of the frame F defined above, where
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Dwa (u) = Dϕ(w), for every u ∈ W
w
a . To obtain the frame F
∗, first, append to
Fϕ = 〈Wϕ, Rϕ〉, for every w ∈ Wϕ and a ∈ Dϕ(w), frames of all such models M
w
a ;
in addition, let wR∗ani and wR
∗bni , for a
n
i and b
n
i belonging to M
w
a , exactly when
Mϕ, w 6|= Pi[a], for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Define D
∗ to agree with Dϕ on Wϕ and to agree
with Dwa on W
w
a , for every w ∈ Wϕ and a ∈ Dϕ(w). To finish off the definition of
the model M∗ = 〈W ∗, R∗, D∗, I∗〉, define I∗(u, P ) to agree with Iwa (u, P ) at the worlds
in the appended models and to be ∅ at the worlds from Wϕ. We can now show that
Mϕ, w |= ψ[a1, . . . , am], if and only if, M
∗, w |= ψ∗[a1, . . . , am], for every w ∈ Wϕ and
every subformula ψ of ϕ.
The proof proceeds by induction on ψ. The only case we explicitly consider here is
ψ = ψ1 → ψ2, leaving the rest to the reader. Assume M
∗, w 6|= ψ∗[a1, . . . , am]. Then,
M∗, u |= ψ∗1[a1, . . . , am] and M
∗, u 6|= ψ∗2 [a1, . . . , am], for some u ∈ W
∗ with wR∗u. If we
could apply the inductive hypothesis to u, we would be done. To see that we can, notice
that ψ∗2 is build out of formulas of the form A
n
i (x) ∨ B
n
i (x) using only ∧, ∨, →, ∃, and
∀. As, in view of Lemma 3.5, formulas Ani (x)∨B
n
i (x) are true at every world of M
∗ that
lies outside of Wϕ and is accessible from Wϕ, we conclude that u ∈ Wϕ, and the inductive
hypothesis is, therefore, applicable. Thus, Mϕ, w 6|= ψ[a1, . . . , am]. The other direction is
straightforward.
We conclude that M∗, w0 6|= ϕ
∗ and, thus, ϕ∗ /∈ QInt. ✷
As the construction of ϕ∗ from ϕ did not introduce any fresh individual variables, we
have the following:
Theorem 3.7 The positive fragment of QInt with two individual variables and a single
predicate letter is undecidable.
We now extend the argument presented above to the logics in the intervals
[QBL,QKC] and [QBL,QFL].
First, to establish the undecidability of the two-variable fragments of logics whose
semantics might contain irreflexive worlds, we need to slightly modify formulas (1) through
(6) listed above. Therefore, we define ψ∗T to be the conjunction of ψ
+
T and following
formula:
∀x ∀y (H(x, y) ∨ (H(x, y)→ q)), (5a)
and define
ϕ∗T = ψ
∗
T → [(∃x (D(x)→ ✷
5q)→ p)→ ✷p].
This enables us to prove, using the tiling problem described above, that T tiles N× N if
and only if ϕ∗T 6∈ L(2), where L ∈ {QBL,QFL
sem}. We leave the details of the proof to
the reader. As the construction of ϕ∗T is uniform for both logics, it follows that the claim
holds for every L ∈ [QBL,QFLsem]. Notice that the same proof also works for logics in
[QBL,QKC]. We simulate binary predicate letters by monadic ones as for QInt. We
now show how to simulate all monadic predicate letters with a single one.
For the interval [QBL,QKC], notice that if we add to the model M∗ built in the
proof of Lemma 3.6 a world d accessible from every element of W ∗ and such that
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I∗(d, P ) = D(d), the resultant model is a model of every logic in the interval [QBL,QKC].
Thus, we have the following:
Theorem 3.8 Let L be a logic in the interval [QBL,QKC]. Then, the positive fragment
of L with two individual variables and a single predicate letter is undecidable.
We next consider the interval [QBL,QFLsem]. In this case, we need to make a more
substantial modification to the frame F, as the semantics of QFLsem prohibits the exis-
tence of reflexive worlds. We then proceed as follows. First, add to W worlds d¯2 and d¯3
with d2Rd¯2 and d3Rd¯3. Second, for every k > 0, do the following: for every world a
k
i , add
to W the world a¯ki and, for every world b
k
i , add to W the world b¯
k
i ; also, let a
k
iRa¯
k
i and
bkiRb¯
k
i , for every k and i. Lastly, whenever in F we had a
k+1
i Ra
k
j or a
k+1
i Rb
k
j , let a¯
k+1
i Ra
k
j
and a¯k+1i Rb
k
j ; also, whenever we had b
k+1
i Ra
k
j or b
k+1
i Rb
k
j , let b¯
k+1
i Ra
k
j and b¯
k+1
i Rb
k
j . We
then define a-suitable models so that I(d¯2, P ) = I(d2, P ), I(d¯3, P ) = I(d3, P ), and for ev-
ery k and i, I(a¯ik, P ) = I(a
i
k, P ) and I(b¯
i
k, P ) = I(b
i
k, P ). In essence, we created “doubles”
for the worlds d2, d3, a
i
k, and b
i
k, which serve to evaluate formulas whose main connective
is → or ∀ at the worlds whose doubles they are. Then, a-suitable models satisfy the con-
dition in the statement of Lemma 3.5, and the model M∗ built in the proof of Lemma 3.6
becomes a model of every logic in [QBL,QFLsem]. As QFL ⊆ QFLsem, we have the
following:
Theorem 3.9 Let L be a logic in the interval [QBL,QFL]. Then, the positive fragment
of L with two individual variables and a single predicate letter is undecidable.
Remark 3.10 Note that the results of this section hold true if we only consider frames
with constant domains.
4 Discussion
As already noticed, the results presented in the present paper concerning sublogics of
QGL and QGrz are quite tight: as shown in [26], for all “natural” sublogics of QGL
and QGrz—including QK, QT, QD, QK4, QS4, QGL, and QGrz—adding to the
restriction to two individual variables and a single monadic predicate letter considered
in section 2 a minor restriction that the modal operators only apply to formulas with at
most one free variable, results in decidable fragments of those logics. It is not difficult
to notice that the results analogous to those obtained in section 2 can be obtained for
quasi-normal logics such as QS (Solovay’s logic) and Lewis’s QS1, QS2, and QS3 [7].
A notable exception in our consideration of modal logics is QS5, whose two-variable
monadic fragment was shown to be undecidable in [12]. While it is not difficult to extend
our results to the multimodal version of QS5—we need to modify the construction used
for sublogics QKTB by substituting a succession of two steps along distinct accessibility
relations for a single step along a single aceessibility relation in the frames of a-suitable
models—nor is it difficult to show, by encoding the tiling problem used in [12], that the
two-variable fragment of QS5 with two monadic predicate letters and infinitely many
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propositional symbols is undecidable, the case of QS5 remains elusive. We conjecture
that the fragment of QS5 with two variables and a single monadic predicate letter is
decidable.
On the other hand, it is relatively straightforward to show that the two-variable frag-
ment of QS5 with a single monadic predicate letter and an infinite supply of individual
variables is undecidable. Indeed, let SIB be the first-order theory of a symmetric ir-
reflexive binary relation S; it is well-known that SIB is undecidable [18, 13]. We can
then simulate S(x, y) as ✷(¬P (x) ∨ ¬P (y)) and show that, if a quantified modal logic
L is valid on a frame containing a world that can see infinitely many worlds, then L is
undecidable in the language with a single monadic predicate letter (and infinitely many
individual variables). This observation covers all modal logics considered in [12], but not
covered by the results of section 2, including QS5, QGL.3, and QGrz.3.
By contrast, we can say nothing about superintuitionistic logics not included in the
interval [QInt,QKC], as our proof relies on the fact that we are working with the positive
fragment of those logics. It is not essential to our proof that formulas Aki (x) and B
k
i (x) be
positive; however, by discarding their positivity we would weaken, rather than strenthen,
our results.
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